American intelligence noticed this trenching system around February 23, 1968. At night the Communists dug shallow trenches from their supply points toward the U.S. Likely or confirmed targets were then pummeled by the available firepower, while the base Fire Support Coordinating Center (FSCC) coordinated the array of supporting arms.Īfter making the trip down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, the NVA established various forward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the combat base. The CIA Joint Technical Advisory Detachment and SOG obtained their information from casual encounters with villagers from regular paid agents, including Rhade and Bru Montagnards and from locals who wanted to be agents of the U.S. Marine reconnaissance patrols, Army Special Forces, CIA personnel, and the MACV-SOG all provided input to the 26th Marines S-2. Shell/flash reports, infrared imagery and analysis of intercepted enemy communications were also used to identify potential enemy targets. Analysis of incoming rocket, mortar and artillery craters determined the likely source of the attacks. Ground and aerial observers supplied visual evidence of enemy activity, as did photoreconnaissance. By Marine estimates, the sensor system provided 40 percent of the raw intelligence at Khe Sanh. This comprehensive sensor system cost approximately $1 billion and was credited with reducing Marine deaths during the fighting by 50 percent. Hundreds of acoustic and seismic sensors were seeded around the combat base. Intelligence was generated locally in many ways. Sources outside the immediate battlefield included intelligence reports from MACV in Saigon, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang, as well as the headquarters of the 3rd Marine Division at Phu Bai. Various sources were utilized to keep track of enemy activity around the Khe Sanh plateau. S-2 knew the siege strategy employed by the NVA at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Con Thien in 1967, and it could predict the enemy’s actions at Khe Sanh. The effectiveness of the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh was heavily dependent on target selection–a responsibility of the intelligence section (S-2) of the 26th Marine Regiment Headquarters Company. Niagara I was the comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort to pinpoint the available targets, and Niagara II was the coordinated shelling and bombing of these targets with all available air and artillery assets. Niagara would be composed of two elements. According to Westmoreland, the name Niagara invoked an appropriate image of cascading shells and bombs.
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forces in Vietnam, chose the code name ‘Operation Niagara’ for the coordination of available firepower at Khe Sanh. The result would be the most spectacular targets of the Vietnam War for American firepower. American tactics were to allow the enemy to surround the 26th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) at Khe Sanh, to mass their forces, reveal troop formations and logistic routes, establish storage and assembly areas, and prepare siege works. Tran Thanh Nam suggested that businesses wishing to export the fruit to the United States should coordinate with the plant quarantine units of Vietnam to complete the necessary documents to allow shipments.By late January 1968, American intelligence sources had detected 20,000 or more NVA soldiers in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. After reviewing comments, APHIS will announce a final decision regarding the authorization of fresh pummelo fruit from Vietnam. Those wanting to comment can visit and enter APHIS-2020-0106 in the search field. The agency will consider all comments received on or before Feb. Photo by Phoenix Han on UnsplashĪPHIS is making the pest risk analysis available to the public for review and comment. market in 60 days.ĪPHIS has proposed specific phytosanitary measures for fresh pummelo consignments that it stated, if met, will minimize the risk of introducing plant pests and noxious weeds into the United States. authorities announced that Vietnamese pummelos will officially enter the U.S. Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Tran Thanh Nam said in early January that U.S. The proposal is part of a pest risk assessment and risk management document that APHIS prepared. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ( APHIS) has proposed that fresh pummelo fruit can be safely imported from Vietnam into the United States.